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Housing slumps may end soon in Germany, Japan and the US; No early prospect of end in Spain and Ireland
By Agustín S. Bénétrix, Barry Eichengreen and Kevin H. O’Rourke
Jul 22, 2010 - 3:55:32 AM
Figure 1: Hazard function; Note: Smoothed hazard function generated by a Cox proportional hazard model. Estimated using the above five explanatory variables. Vertical axis measures the hazard of a slump end.
Housing slumps may end soon in Germany, Japan and
the US but there is no early prospect of a reversal in fortunes for markets in
countries such as Spain and Ireland, according to newly published research.
Agustín S. Bénétrix, post-doctoral
fellow at the Institute for International Integration Studies (IIIS),
Trinity College Dublin , Barry Eichengreen , professor of economics and
political science at the University of California, Berkeley and Kevin H.
O’Rourke, professor of economics at
Trinity College Dublin, say that the the world's current economic problems started when housing bubbles burst
in several advanced economies. Economic recovery without housing market
recovery is unlikely to be sustained. The column below from VoxEU.org, presents new research on
the probability of housing slumps ending. There is at least a one-in-eight
chance of housing slumps in the three big economies (US, Japan and Germany)
ending imminently, but there is nothing approaching the same probability
elsewhere. If things turn out as projected here, we may be about to have a
test of the locomotive theory – whether the big economies can pull along
their smaller brethren – both for housing markets and generally.
As concern over the sustainability of public debts has risen to the top
of the list of macroeconomic concerns, it has become too easy to forget that
this crisis started with a housing slump (Cecchetti 2007). How it ends will
also depend, in part, on housing markets.
Construction is a particularly volatile component of economic activity.
Changes in house prices can powerfully impact consumer confidence.
House-price developments have obvious implications for bank balance sheets
and the condition of financial institutions. All these are reasons for
worrying that economic recovery without housing-market recovery is unlikely
to be sustained.
How house prices now develop in different countries will, of course,
depend on country-specific circumstances. But it is nonetheless possible to
pick out some general patterns in how housing slumps end, and why.
In recent research, we define the start of a slump as the point in time
where the house price index adjusted for inflation is at a local maximum,
and its end as the local minimum. To declare a slump definitively over, we
also require inflation-adjusted prices to rise on average for four
subsequent quarters. Our method identifies 44 slumps (shown in the appendix)
with both start and end dates between 1970Q1 and 2009Q1 (Bénétrix,
Eichengreen, and O'Rourke 2010).
Five variables go a long way toward explaining whether a slump is poised
to end:
The cumulative rise in house prices prior to the slump. This
captures the idea that the duration of a house price bust should be
related to the size of the preceding boom.
The cumulative house price fall during the slump. If slumps involve
the realignment of prices to sustainable levels, then the probability of
their ending will depend on how much of that price adjustment has taken
place.
GDP growth in the current quarter, previous studies finding a tight
relationship between housing prices and the business cycle.
Mortgage interest rates in the current quarter as a measure of the
cost of housing finance.
Private credit growth during the current year as a way of capturing
access to credit.
We estimated this model on quarterly data for 18 countries (Table 1).
Table 1: Baseline probit model
Coeff.
Semi-elasticities. Variables
evaluated at:
Mean
median
pc. 10
pc. 90
Bubble
-0.012***
-0.028***
-0.028***
-0.029***
-0.025***
(0.003)
(0.009)
(0.008)
(0.009)
(0.009)
Cum. price fall
0.038***
0.092***
0.091***
0.096***
0.083***
(0.009)
(0.023)
(0.024)
(0.029)
(0.018)
GDP growth
0.168***
0.404***
0.403***
0.425***
0.365***
(0.055)
(0.138)
(0.137)
(0.162)
(0.115)
Interest rate
-0.039*
-0.095*
-0.094*
-0.100*
-0.086
(0.024)
(0.057)
(0.057)
(0.057)
(0.055)
Private credit
0.024*
0.057*
0.057*
0.060*
0.051**
(0.012)
(0.030)
(0.030)
(0.035)
(0.024)
Obs.
1064
1064
1064
1064
1064
Pseudo-R2
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
0.12
Probability
2.1
2.1
1.5
3.9
Note: Probit model estimated using a dummy variable taking value one
in each slump end date and zero otherwise. Country fixed-effects included.
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Semi-elasticities are
the percentage change in the probability of bottoming out in response to a
one unit change in the explanatory variable.
All five variables have their expected effects. The impact of previous
house price booms on the probability of a slump ending in the current
quarter is negative and significant. A 1 percentage point increase in the
house price boom reduces the probability of bottoming out in the current
quarter by 2.5 to 2.9%. Similarly, the cumulative house price fall has a
positive effect on the probability of the slump ending. A 1 percentage point
increase in the cumulative fall (relative to the level at the start of the
slump) increases the probability of bottoming out by 8.3-9.6 percent.
Output growth has a negative effect on the duration of the slump. On
average a 1 percentage point increase in output growth rates raises the
probability of bottoming out in the current quarter by 36.5 to 42.5 percent.
Financial conditions also matter. A one percentage point increase in the
real mortgage rate reduces the probability of a slump ending by 8.6-10%.
Private credit growth as a measure of access to finance has the opposite
effect: a 1 percentage point increase in the growth rate of private credit
during the slump increases the probability of prices bottoming out by 5.1-6
%.
Table 2 uses the latest data for 2010Q1 on GDP growth and mortgage
interest rates to estimate the likelihood that housing slumps in different
countries will now come to an end. The countries where this is most likely
are Germany, Japan and the U.S. Germany never saw much of a housing bubble
and has now registered relatively strong GDP growth. Japan has seen a very
large house-price decline, has low mortgage rates, and has recently shown
signs of stronger growth. Similar conditions make for a 13 per cent
probability that the U.S. housing slump will end in the current quarter.
(July’s exceptionally bad National Association of Home Builders confidence
survey for the U.S. reminds us than one in eight is less than one.)
The model also points to a statistically significant probability of
housing slumps now ending in Finland, France and New Zealand, but the
likelihood of this happening in the last two countries is so small as to be
economically negligible.
At the other end of the spectrum are countries like Spain and Ireland
which experienced big housing bubbles and now big economic slumps, with no
great prospects for immediate economic recovery. Our estimates suggest that
ongoing housing slumps will continue to add to their woes. The 3.6 per cent
year-on-year fall in Spain in the recently-completed second quarter of the
year is consistent with this prediction. So is the 4.2 per cent decline in
asking prices for Irish residential properties in the same period.
On the other hand, allowing prices to adjust downwards rapidly in these
countries is the best way to ensure that they eventually stop falling, given
the importance of our “cumulative price fall” variable. In some further
results, we find that the probability of exiting a slump declines after it
has been ongoing for 30 quarters (see Figure 1 above). If price adjustment is
needed, it is important to let that price adjustment take place.
Table 2: Predicted end probabilities for ongoing slumps
(1)
(2)
Finland
1.5*
6.1***
France
0.3
0.6*
Germany
18.2***
16.1***
Ireland
0.3
0.3
Japan
4.8*
16.2***
New Zealand
0.4
1.0**
Spain
1.2
1.4
US
4.8**
12.7**
Note: Simulated probabilities using latest values of all variables by
country. Column (1) uses data for 2009Q1, which is included to estimate the
baseline model. Column (2) uses OECD latest estimates for GDP growth in
2010Q1 and IMF mortgage rates for 2010Q1 or 2009Q4 where available. *, **
and *** indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Conclusions
The good news, then, is that there is at least a one-in-eight chance of
housing slumps in the three big economies ending imminently, which in turn
will be positive for economic growth. The bad news is that there is nothing
approaching the same probability elsewhere. If things turn out as projected
here, we may be about to have a test of the locomotive theory – whether the
big economies can pull along their smaller brethren – both for housing
markets and generally.
References
Agustín Bénétrix,
Barry Eichengreen, and Kevin H. O'Rourke (2010), "How Housing Slumps End",
mimeo.
Appendix
House price slumps (inflation-adjusted prices)
No.
Country
Start date
End date
Slump size
Growth afterwards
Year
quarter
year
quarter
1
US
1979
2
1983
4
-9.4
0.4
2
US
1989
3
1996
4
-11.6
0.7
3
UK
1973
3
1978
1
-32.8
3.6
4
UK
1989
3
1996
2
-31.4
1.7
5
Belgium
1970
1
1971
3
-8.2
1.2
6
Belgium
1979
3
1985
2
-35.6
0.9
7
Denmark
1973
3
1974
3
-13.7
3.2
8
Denmark
1979
2
1982
4
-36.0
4.9
9
Denmark
1986
1
1993
2
-35.6
3.4
10
France
1970
1
1971
2
-6.2
1.7
11
France
1980
4
1984
4
-19.2
0.4
12
France
1991
1
1997
1
-16.6
0.7
13
Germany
1975
1
1976
3
-5.1
0.7
14
Germany
1981
2
1989
2
-14.2
1.4
15
Italy
1981
2
1986
3
-36.3
0.7
16
Italy
1992
4
1996
1
-12.5
0.5
17
Italy
1997
2
1999
4
-3.4
0.3
18
Netherlands
1978
2
1986
1
-50.3
1.4
19
Norway
1970
1
1973
1
-5.1
1.0
20
Norway
1980
2
1983
4
-9.1
4.0
21
Norway
1987
2
1993
1
-41.4
3.5
22
Sweden
1970
1
1971
3
-7.0
0.8
23
Sweden
1979
3
1986
2
-40.0
1.7
24
Sweden
1990
1
1995
4
-31.9
0.6
25
Switzerland
1973
1
1977
1
-27.4
0.3
26
Switzerland
1989
4
2000
4
-36.8
0.6
27
Canada
1976
1
1984
3
-21.8
0.5
28
Canada
1989
4
1991
3
-12.3
0.6
29
Japan
1973
4
1978
1
-28.7
0.9
30
Finland
1970
4
1972
2
-6.8
3.6
31
Finland
1974
1
1979
4
-26.5
0.4
32
Finland
1989
2
1995
4
-50.8
3.0
33
Finland
1999
4
2001
4
-5.3
1.7
34
Ireland
1970
4
1973
2
-9.6
0.9
35
Ireland
1979
2
1987
2
-32.0
1.4
36
Spain
1978
2
1982
2
-35.0
2.0
37
Spain
1991
4
1997
4
-24.1
1.5
38
Australia
1974
1
1978
4
-17.5
1.7
39
Australia
1986
2
1987
3
-8.4
4.0
40
Australia
1989
2
1996
4
-7.3
1.1
41
New Zealand
1974
3
1980
4
-38.2
3.3
42
New Zealand
1984
2
1986
4
-8.3
2.9
43
New Zealand
1990
1
1992
1
-7.9
0.4
44
New Zealand
1997
2
2000
4
-7.2
0.6
Note: Author’s calculations based on Bank of International
Settlements (BIS) data.