EU Economy
Ireland accounted for 25% of ECB's emergency lending by time of 2010 bailout
By Michael Hennigan, Finfacts founder and editor
Nov 7, 2014 - 8:47 AM

Printer-friendly page from Finfacts Ireland Business News - Click for the News Main Page - A service of the Finfacts Ireland Business and Finance Portal

Michael Noonan, finance minister, and Jean-Claude Trichet, ECB president, Brussels, March 2011.

The European Central Bank (ECB) said on Thursday that by the time of the international bailout of Ireland in November 2010, we accounted for 25% of the central bank's emergency lending to banks in euro area countries.

The ECB made a strong defence of its actions coinciding with the release of copies of four letters that were exchanged in 2010 between Jean-Claude Trichet, ECB president, and Brian Lenihan, finance minister - in a key letter dated November 19, 2010, Trichet said that the governing council would cut off liquidity if Ireland did not agree to participate in an international bailout.

Ireland had unilaterally issued a guarantee of bank deposits and  bank debts on September 30 2008 and following the expiry of the guarantee in September 2010, market tensions mounted and as foreign deposits flowed from Irish banks, the Central Bank of Ireland had to provide €50bn in emergency funding.

The ECB said yesterday: "In January 2010 the Eurosystem was providing approximately €90bn – including Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) – to Irish banks. This support began to accelerate rapidly in the latter part of the third quarter of 2010 and had reached about €140bn (including ELA), or around 85% of Irish GDP, by November 2010. This represented around one fourth of the ECB’s total lending – an unprecedented level of exposure to a country such as Ireland, whose share in the capital of the ECB was less than one percent."

There was no bail-in mechanism in 2010 and sovereign support for Irish banks covering both senior bondholder debt and depositors in Anglo Irish Bank amounted to €64bn.

Mario Draghi, ECB president, said on Thursday that people Ireland's recovery  proves the bailout decision was not "stupid" - even though it was the Irish Government had agreed to it.

"The decision to ask for a programme was the Government's decision, it was not the ECB forcing the Government to do this," he said.

"But I think the four letters how exactly the kind of dialogue that took place between the Government and the then-president of the ECB, Jean Claude Trichet."

"So for me, there is very little to add to that."

Draghi added that people “look at past events with today’s eyes” and he added about the growth outlook that the bailout “decision wasn’t that stupid.”

The reality about the letters was that the bailout was inevitable by November 19 when Trichet penned his key letter.

On Nov 18, 2010, The New York Times published an op-ed by John Banville, the Irish writer, titled: "The Debtor of the Western World":

There used to be a nice acronym that neatly expressed how the Irish people conceive of themselves: MOPE, that is, Most Oppressed People Ever. For a decade or so, when the Tiger was at its fiercest, we threw off the mantle of oppression, as once we had thrown off what used to be called “the yoke of British rule.” On Wednesday, the British chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, announced in Brussels that his government stood ready to help Ireland in its hour of need. Oh, bitter day.

All the same, life goes on, somehow. We are learning a new resilience. Humbled as we are, we might even begin to learn social responsibility, a quality in which we have been singularly lacking up to now. Who knows, we may at last recognize the irreplaceable value of public and private honesty. But let us not light the firecrackers just yet."

  • In the years leading up to the crisis, the Irish economy experienced a build-up of imbalances that eventually inflicted large damage on the economy. The economy had become overly reliant on the construction sector as both a driver of growth and a source of tax revenue. In this context, credit growth expanded excessively along with public expenditure. Private debt reached unsustainably high levels, resulting in huge risks for Irish banks.
  • This toxic dynamic was aggravated by the fact that the domestic banking sector, for which the Irish authorities bore responsibility, was insufficiently regulated at that time. Moreover, Ireland’s higher inflation led to real interest rates significantly below euro area average levels for a number of years, fuelling incentives to borrow. Finally, the Irish economy became less competitive in those years. Between 1998 and 2008, unit labour costs had increased by 50%, compared with 19% in the euro area as a whole during the same period.
  • For a more detailed overview, please see “The Irish case from an ECB perspective”, a speech given by Jörg Asmussen, then Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, at the Institute of International and European Affairs in Dublin on 12 April 2012.
  • While it is fully understandable that Irish citizens feel acutely aggrieved by the legacy of the crisis, it was domestic policy-makers who were responsible for the inadequate polices relating to e.g. banking supervision, public finances and the loss of competitiveness. In particular, it was a lack of adequate domestic macro-prudential policies which failed to mitigate the excessive credit growth and subsequent housing boom.
  • Undoubtedly, there were also external aggravating factors which contributed to the crisis in Ireland, including the fact that the crisis prevention framework in the euro area was neither complete nor sufficiently effective. The reforms to EU governance introduced during the crisis will help to prevent future crises.
  • The ECB took a critical view of the government guarantee of bank liabilities for a period of two years (see ECB Opinions CON/2008/44 and CON/2008/48). It triggered an intense negative spiralling effect between the banking sector and the sovereign. The guarantee was introduced by the Irish government without any coordination with European partners. It was superseded by the Eligible Liabilities Guarantee (ELG) scheme in December 2009, which was formally consistent with European agreements on guarantee schemes.
  • The expiry of the two-year bank guarantee was one of the main factors leading to the loss of market access. Market concerns, especially from the second half of October 2010 onwards, that future bail-outs may involve burden-sharing with private investors, acted as an additional aggravating factor in the surge of yields in stressed euro area countries. Ultimately, markets lost confidence and, as a consequence, the Irish government had to ask for official support.
  • The decisions outlined above by the Irish authorities, the sheer scale of the domestic crisis and aggravating external factors led to Ireland’s application for an EU/IMF adjustment programme.
  • In the months leading up to the application for a programme, information about the extent of the difficulties in the banking sector was entering the public domain while the fiscal implications stemming from the collapse in revenues were becoming ever more apparent. The Irish government started to prepare an ambitious four-year economic strategy, in close cooperation with the Commission in liaison with the ECB. This notwithstanding, markets eventually lost confidence. As described in the letter of the former Irish Minister for Finance to the former ECB President dated 4 November 2010, Irish spreads started widening considerably. When an economy does not have market access, it is no longer capable of functioning and requires an adjustment programme to restore sustainability, instill confidence and restore market access. The Irish government needed, therefore, to ask for official support.
  • Turning to the role of the ECB, for several years prior to the commencement of the EU/IMF adjustment programme, as well as in the subsequent period, the level of liquidity provided by the Eurosytem in support of Ireland’s banking system had been extraordinary. In the period preceding the start of the adjustment programme, the Eurosystem had already been providing exceptional levels of support to Irish banks. In January 2010 the Eurosystem was providing approximately €90bn – including Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) – to Irish banks. This support began to accelerate rapidly in the latter part of the third quarter of 2010 and had reached about €140bn (including ELA), or around 85% of Irish GDP, by November 2010. This represented around one fourth of the ECB’s total lending – an unprecedented level of exposure to a country such as Ireland, whose share in the capital of the ECB was less than one percent.
  • While the ECB always acted within its remit and in line with rules established for the whole of the euro area, there are limits to the support that the Eurosystem can provide to banks in the Member States. Such limits are governed by the widely accepted rules to which the participation in Eurosystem credit operations is subject. First, collateral has to be adequate; and second, counterparts have to be financially sound and solvent. The letter dated 15 October 2010 from the former ECB President recalled these rules and their implications for Ireland.
  • As outlined in the subsequent letter sent by the former Irish Minister for Finance to the former ECB President on 4 November 2010, by early November 2010 the situation in Ireland had rapidly deteriorated. It was on account of the extreme severity of the crisis engulfing Ireland, as well as the rules that govern Eurosystem credit operations, that the Governing Council of the ECB had a duty to address the situation. Consequently, a letter on behalf of the Governing Council was sent by the former ECB President to the former Irish Minister for Finance on 19 November 2010. This letter explained the conditions under which further provisions of ELA to Irish financial institutions could be authorised. In his already public reply of 21 November 2010, the Irish Minister for Finance stated that he fully understood the concerns raised by the ECB Governing Council.
  • The involvement of the ECB in the area of burden-sharing in Ireland has frequently been misunderstood and at times misrepresented. Moreover, when assessing certain policy choices, one has to bear in mind the situation at the time, as well as the counterfactual scenario.
  • First of all, one fact that is often overlooked in commentaries is that there was a substantial bail-in of subordinated debt issued by the Irish banks. Over the period 2009-2011, the total cash gained from the burden-sharing of subordinated debt was just under €14bn.
  • As regards the possible bailing-in of senior debt in late 2010, it is important to recall the words of EU leaders in a European Union statement of 29 October 2010 and during the G20 meeting in South Korea on 12 November, according to which burden-sharing of senior debt would not be applied until mid-2013. It should be emphasised that this took place amid an environment of heightened uncertainty and following a surge in the yields of stressed euro area countries in the previous month.
  • Furthermore, the necessary EU governance tools to address the bail-in of creditors, which were set out in the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) and have been fully endorsed by the ECB, were not available in late 2010.
  • It was against this adverse backdrop and after the statement issued at the G20 meeting that the negotiations over Ireland’s EU/IMF adjustment programme took place.
  • Following the statements in late 2010, which were designed to calm markets and support financial stability, any potential burden-sharing of senior debt in the immediate aftermath would first and foremost have had negative spillover effects on the financial stability of Ireland, as well as on other European countries.
  • It was not until the latter part of 2011 that the possible bail-in of senior debt issued by Irish banks, notably Anglo Irish Bank, came actually to the fore within the Irish EU/IMF programme.
  • In line with the aforementioned statements by EU leaders, the ECB was of the view that the Irish authorities’ decision to fully honour the outstanding senior debts of Anglo Irish Bank was the least damaging course of action to pursue. There is no doubt that this was a very difficult decision for them to take and Irish citizens to accept.
  • It should be stressed that this decision was taken during a period of still acute uncertainty. In addition, the potential benefits arising from any burden-sharing with senior bondholders of Anglo Irish Bank were considerably outweighed by the possible risks this could entail, particularly in the context of an ongoing recapitalisation of the Irish banking sector and the continued fragile state of the sector as a whole. Therefore, the negative spillover effects of the bail-in would primarily have had an impact on the other Irish banks, some of which held senior bonds for even higher amounts than Anglo Irish Bank, as well as on other European countries.
  • More specifically, it should be emphasised that the potential amount of savings that could be made when, in late 2011, the issue of burden-sharing of senior debt issued by Anglo Irish Bank went on the programme’s agenda, was limited – somewhere between €3 and €4bn.  This should be compared with the risks that the bail-in option would have entailed at that point in time, when market sentiment was severely shaken and there were no clear EU rules on a pecking order in crisis resolution. First and foremost, the Irish government was in the process of undertaking a very significant recapitalisation of Irish banks to an amount of around €24bn, or approximately 14% of GDP. This undertaking was a cornerstone of the programme and a key element in securing the recovery of the Irish banking sector and, consequently, the overall economy. It was pertinent that the effectiveness of this measure would not in any way be undermined, in the ultimate interest of the Irish tax-payers. Second, the bank guarantee/ELG made it much more complicated to pursue the bail-in option. Third, and more generally, given the extraordinary stress and great uncertainty in financial markets at the time, a bail-in could have had very adverse consequences for financial stability in Ireland, with negative spillover effects on banks in Ireland and other euro area countries.
  • In summary, the sequence of actions undertaken laid the foundations for the significant rebound in confidence that the Irish banking system has subsequently experienced, especially in the past two years. This virtuous circle may not have materialised had confidence in the banking sector been undermined in 2011.
  • At the same time, the ECB does welcome that the necessary EU governance tools are now available to facilitate the possible bail-in of bank creditors. This is outlined in the ECB Opinion on a proposal for a directive establishing a framework for recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (CON/2012/99).
  • It should be noted that, along with the other euro area countries, Ireland has benefited from both the ECB’s standard and non-standard monetary policy measures. These have been crucial for the country’s stabilisation, in particular the announcement on Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) over the course of the summer of 2012.

© Copyright 2011 by Finfacts.com